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Executive Summary 
 
Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide capital for business start-ups in 
return for an ownership stake. The outcomes of angel investments are not high for all angels 
and not evenly distributed among all investors. I examine what characteristics of angel 
investors affect the outcome of their investments.  
This research is based on a North American survey data set. . I use the internal rate of 
return to measure the performance of angel investments. More specifically, I use three 
different standards to code it as success or failure: median standard, mean standard, and 
higher standard. Then, I use OLS and a probit model to regress investment success on five 
explanatory variables that represent the post-investment involvement of angel investors 
(interacted time with the company, due diligence, and duration of investment) and the basic 
characteristics of angel investors (their education level and their experience period in the 
industry of venture).  
The only thing I can predict in low level of success (median and mean standard) is 
that the later the stage, the more likely success is. However, in the high level of success, 
angels may positively influence their investment performance with sufficient due diligence 
and maintaining long-term investment as post-investment involvement. I find that the stage of 
the venture at the time of their investment, due diligence and duration of investment are the 
primary determinants of the successful angel investors. Also, this research indicates that the 
post-investment involvement of angels, rather than their characteristics, is more likely to be 
related to the improved performance of the angel investors. 
 Policy makers can set criteria for select which angel investors to support, at least 
encouraging minimal due diligence, using this research, and with that, policy makers can 
increase the efficiency of government support, although lessons from one country should not 
be transferred naively to another. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Capital is one of the main difficulties of new start-ups until they have grown to such 
an extent that institutional investors or banks become interested in investing in them. For 
these start-ups, early-stage individual investors, known as angel investors, play a critical role 
as suppliers of capital. An angel investor or angel (also known as a business angel, informal 
investor or angel funder) is defined as an affluent individual who provides capital for a 
business start-up, usually in exchange for convertible debt or ownership equity.  
Angel investment is an important element for many start-up firms to grow. It allows a 
company to overcome the capital gap between seed or early-stage investment and growth-
stage investment. As shown in Table 1, venture capital companies are, for the most part, 
focused on later stage start-ups and therefore have left a significant equity gap for the seed 
and early-stage start-ups (OECD, 2011). Without investment by angels, a small company has 
no choice but to depend on bank loans to raise capital, which forces an entrepreneur become 
a delinquent borrower if the business fails.  
Table 1 - Equity investors at the stage of firm growth (OECD, 2011) 
Informal investors Formal investors 
Founders, friends 
and family 
Angel investors (typical 
investment size: 25-500K USD) 
Venture capital funds (typical investment 
size: 3-5M USD) 
Seed stage investments Early stage investments Later stage investments 
 
Also, an angel investor provides non-financial assistance like management consulting 
services in addition to the financial support. Angels are often experienced entrepreneurs, and, 
in many cases, they give back by helping other entrepreneurs (OECD, 2011). 
Another important role of angel investors is that they are significant contributors to 
job growth. According to the Center for Venture Research of the U.S. (CVR), 264,200 new 
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jobs were created in the United States in 2014 through angel investments, which is equal to 
3.6 jobs per angel investment. 
In the U.S., angel investment began in earnest in the 1960s in Silicon Valley, the hub 
of high-tech start-ups. According to the Center for Venture Research at the University of New 
Hampshire (2015), 316,600 active angel investors invested a total of $24.1 billion in 73,400 
entrepreneurial ventures in 2014, which is a robust amount and is close to the market high of 
$26.0 billion that occurred in 2007. Nowadays, there are several “angel groups.” They consist 
of angel investors who pool their capital and share their resources for investment and their 
opinions. The Angel Capital Association of the U.S. has about 300 American angel investor 
groups listed in its database. 
Figure 1 – Angel investment and angels of the U.S. 
  
 
A number of countries have adopted policies or government support ranging from tax 
incentives to co-investment as a catalyst for developing the angel market, citing the 
information asymmetries and potential spillover effects (OECD, 2011), and government 
intervention in angel investment has steadily increased. For example, 27 state governments in 
the U.S. provide a tax deduction of up to 50% of the angel investment and the Japanese 
government started giving a 40% income deduction for angel investment in 2008. In Korea, 
the government belatedly increased the ratio of tax deductions from 30% to 50% in 2014 
4 
 
after noticing the strong impact of angels on the venture industry, and started offering 10 
million dollars matching funds in 2011 and, cumulatively 172 million dollars in 2015.  
However, the outcomes of angel investment are not high for all angels, and not 
evenly distributed among the investors. According to David Rose (2014), a famous angel 
investor in New York, only 10% of angel investors get a return of 10 times their original 
investments, while 50% of angel investors ultimately lose. These results roughly coincide 
with the European Business Angel Networks (EBAN) Secretariat’s report (2014) that only 53% 
of angel investment market makes a profit.  
Then, what makes the difference in the outcomes of angel investors? In order to 
increase the efficiency of government support, policy makers have to know which angel 
investors or start-ups have a greater possibility of success, and also have to lead them to 
become that kind of investor or firm. What’s more, from the answer, policy makers can find 
the most efficient way to promote angel investment.  
Thus, I will analyze the factors influencing the successful outcome of an angel 
investor with regard to an angel’s characteristics, such as frequency of interaction the angel 
investor had with the company, years of working experience the angel investor had in an 
industry related to the venture, or the number of hours of due diligence this investor 
conducted prior to making their investment.  
The insights furnished by this study could provide a starting point for policy-makers 
to screen angel investors for support, and, with that, they can increase the efficiency of 
government support.   
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2. Literature Review 
 
Numerous papers analyze the characteristics shared by successful small and medium-
sized businesses. For instance, Ana M. Moreno (2007) examined the main factors, including 
firm’s age, size, or entrepreneur’s ability, that allow one to distinguish between high-growth 
firms and low-growth firms.  
Also, there are many studies that indicate angel investors play an important role for 
the high-growth start-up firms. For example, Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2010) stated that 
angel funding is positively correlated with business survival, access to follow-on funding, and 
faster growth, using a regression discontinuity approach to compare firms that obtain funding 
and those that do not. Mason (2007) also highlighted the significance of the informal venture 
capital market in terms of offering their business skills and personal networks as well as 
financial investment. 
However, there are only a couple of papers that look at what distinguishes more 
successful angel investors from less successful ones. Robert Wiltbank and Warren Boeker 
(2007) showed detailed information about the average return of group-affiliated angel 
investment, and indicated that due diligence, experience in the industry of their portfolio 
companies, and participation of angel investors have a positive impact on their outcomes. On 
the other hand, they revealed that follow-on investments of angel investors had a negative 
effect on the investment performance1.  
However, Wiltbank and Boeker (2007) simply compared the average returns between 
the group above the median and the group below the median from the perspective of due 
diligence time, experience, and participation. For example, the high due diligence group 
                                          
1 They say that additional research may be needed to better understand these results. 
6 
 
(spend more than 20 hours median due diligence) had a 5.9 times return on investment, 
whereas the low due diligence group (spend less than 20 hours) had only a 1.1 times return on 
investment. But this research is important in the way that it revealed angel investors may 
influence their return rate by increasing due diligence time, avoiding portfolios in unfamiliar 
industries, and actively participating at least a couple of times per month, even though it is 
not clear whether these high outcomes are a direct result of their involvement, and why the 
follow-on investment is correlated with their lower performance.  
The effect of angel involvement on the performance of their investments can be seen 
in the research of Chua and Wu (2009). Chua and Wu (2009) stated that post-investment 
involvement of angel investors adds value. They determined that post-investment 
involvement of angel investors, including serving as a sounding board for management, 
helping management develop strategy, helping secure additional financing, or mentoring 
management, has a significant positive impact on the performance of angel investors. Both 
Wiltbank and Boeker (2007) and Chua and Wu (2009) use Kauffman Foundation data. The 
latter study focused on only the post-investment involvement. Thus, the other factors, such as 
due diligence time which was one of main factors of Wiltbank and Boeker (2007), were not 
considered. 
Also, Lennart Pape (2014) investigated the relation between angel investors’ 
involvement and performance. Pape characterizes business angels’ involvement using 
Politis’s (2008) four roles: sounding board/strategic management role, supervision and 
monitoring role, resource acquisition role, and mentoring role. According to his study, there is 
a mixed effect. “Providing help with finding suppliers and customers (resource acquisition 
role)” and “providing additional fundraising from other business angels (resource acquisition 
role)” have a positive impact on investment performance, whereas “providing help with the 
recruitment of key employees (resource acquisition role)”, “providing management time 
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(sounding board/strategic role)” and “providing help by solving strategic/management issues 
(sounding board/strategic role)” all have a negative impact on the angel’s outcomes. Also, 
“the frequency of interaction” of angel investors negatively contributes to the investment 
performance. These results contrast with the previous study by Wiltbank and Boeker (2007). 
Additionally, the study is limited in that it only investigates the impact of post-investment 
involvement. 
Most research on this topic focuses on the relation between the investors’ 
involvement and the performance of their investments. However, various factors besides 
post-investment involvement affect the outcomes of angel investors, and research sometimes 
showed different results regarding whether their impact is positive or negative.  
In order for policy makers to find the most efficient way to promote angel investment, 
I will analyze the various individual characteristics influencing the successful outcome of an 
angel investor without being limited to angel investors’ involvement. In this respect, this 
study will take into account several variables including the factors which were mentioned in 
the previous papers, such as frequency of interaction the angel investor had with the company, 
years of working experience the angel investor had in an industry related to the venture, or 
the number of hours of due diligence this investor conducted prior to making an investment.  
 
 
3. Research Questions 
 
Angel investors play a critical role as suppliers of capital for start-ups. According to 
the European Trade Association for Business Angels (EBAN), business angels make up 73% 
of the total European early-stage investment market, followed by venture capital industry 
investing (26%) and equity crowd funding investments (1%) in 2014. 
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However, because of the information asymmetries between angels and start-ups, 
there is market failure in seed and early-stage financing or funding gap between seed or 
early-stage investment and growth-stage investment. For this reason, a number of countries 
have chosen policies or government support, ranging from tax incentives to co-investment 
funds. The first policy for developing the angel market is the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(EIS) which the U.K. government established in 1995 as a tax incentive. The purpose of tax 
incentives is to increase the number of angel investors and the amount of capital, raising the 
risk-reward ratio of angel investment. The details of the tax incentives are different in each 
country as shown in Table 2. Tax incentives can involve deduction from angel investment 
income, deduction of investment tax amount or deduction of angel investment loss. 
 
Table 2 – Comparing National Tax Incentives (Seo, 2015) 
Country Deduction of 
investment 
Deduction of profit Deduction of loss 
U.S. 10~100% 
(varies by state) 
Deferral of tax on re-
invested profits 
$50,000 limit on 
deduction 
U.K. 20% Deduction of transfer 
gains 
48% of income limit 
on deduction 
Japan 40% Deferral of tax on re-
invested profit 
3 years deduction 
carried forward 
Singapore 50% 50% deduction of 
transfer gains 
- 
South Korea 30~100% 
(different in $) 
Deduction of transfer 
gains 
- 
 
On the other hand, co-investment funds, also known as matching funds, have been 
set up to stimulate angel investments in start-ups, with their investments matched by 
government funds.   
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Table 3 – Matching Funds in Different Countries (Song, 2015) 
Country 
Name and year of 
establishment 
Main contents 
Scotland 
Scottish Co-Investment Fund, 
2003 
- 72M ￡ 
- angel investor and venture capitals 
- 1M ￡ limitation per firm 
Netherlands 
TechnoPartners Seed Facility, 
2005 
- 50% of investment, maximum 4M€ 
New Zealand Seed Co-Investment Fund, 2005 - 40M$ (New Zealand dollar) 
U.K. Co-Investment Fund, 2011 
- 50M ￡ 
- same amount matching  
 
If policy makers can analyze which angel investors have greater chances of success, 
it can result in a more efficient way to promote angel investment. For example, the South 
Korean government has run the Korea Fund of Funds (KFF) as a vehicle for financing for 
local SMEs since 2005. The KFF invests in venture capital (VC) funds that are selected in 
order to increase the efficiency of government support, and with the capital from the KFF, 
VC funds invite more capital from the private sector to increase their funds. With this 
mechanism, the South Korean government creates a synergy with private capital to be 
invested in SMEs rather than directly providing loans or guarantees. The case of the KFF 
could serve as an example for a policy to promote angel investment. If another kind of fund 
of funds, like the KFF, could be established to subsidize angel investors, or if the KFF could 
invest in angel investment, policy makers would need criteria to select which angel investors 
to support. Thus, analysis of the performance of the angels’ investment and their 
characteristics is essential for future policies. With that, policy makers can increase the 
efficiency of government support and the capital in start-ups. It is not known whether 
characteristics shared by successful angels are the same across countries, with different 
institutions and attitudes toward risk-taking. Therefore, lessons from one country should not 
10 
 
be transferred naively to another. My analysis uses North American data, which reflect a 
culture that promotes risk-taking and is tolerant of failure, or even encourages it. Such a 
setting may attract a different pool of start-up founders than settings where this or other 
conditions are absent, and angels may choose among different options in different settings.  
 From this point of view, I will examine what factors of angel investors affect the 
outcome of angel investment. The research questions can be summarized as follows: 
- What are the primary determinants of the successful angel investors?  
 - Are the basic characteristics of angel investors and the post-investment involvement 
of angel investors related to the improved performance of the angel investors? 
 
 
4. Methodology  
 
Data Sources  
There is a paucity of data on angel investors and their investment performance.    
This research is based on a survey data set from the Angel Investor Performance 
Project (AIPP) conducted by the Kauffman Foundation. It has been available for public use 
from the website (www.kauffman.org/aipp) since it was collected in 2007. According to the 
AIPP, 539 angel investors who are members of 86 angel investor groups throughout North 
America participated in an online questionnaire2 and were asked for information on the 
investors’ experience, their basic characteristics, the ventures in which they had invested and 
details about their investment in an exit from those ventures. This data set was also used in 
the research of Wiltbank and Boeker (2007) and Chua and Wu (2009). 
                                          
2 The response rate of the surveys was 31% out of 276 of the angel investor groups, and 13% of 
the members in these 86groups participated (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007) 
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The data set includes following information. 
* total cash out: sum of all dollars that the angel investor received from the venture 
* total invested: sum of all dollars that the angel invested in the venture 
* years held: years between the angel investors initial investment in the venture and the 
exit event of the venture 
* years inv: years that the angel investor had been investing 
* years entre: years that the angel investor had been an entrepreneur  
* edlevel: their education level  
* stage: stage of the venture at the time of their investment 
* initialinvest: $ amount of their initial investment  
* initrevs: revenues of the venture at the time of the investor’s investment 
* coinvestors: the number of other investors that joined in the investment in the venture at 
the time the angel investor invested  
* diligence: the number of hours of due diligence the investor conducted prior to making 
their investment 
* industryexp: years of working experience the angel investor had in an industry related to 
this venture 
* interaction: frequency of interaction the angel investor had with the company. 6 = daily, 
5 = weekly, 4 = monthly, 3 = quarterly, 2 = annually, 1 = rarely if at all 
 The descriptive statistics for selected variables are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Statistical methodology 
The main research question of this paper is that what are the determinants of angel 
investors’ performance? In order to address this question, I define the IRR (internal rate of 
return of angel investment per year) as the performance of the angel investment. It can be 
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calculated from the multiplier (the ratio of output to input of angel investment) and 
investment period (yearsheld).  
multiplier = totalcashout / totalinvested  ----------------------------------- (2) 
irr = multiplier(1/yearsheld) – 1   ---------------------------------------------- (3)3 
Table 4 presents the summarized results of multiplier and irr. The angels in the 
sample have 10.58 average multiplier which is total cash out over total investment, and have 
26.8% of an average internal rate of return per year. 
Table 4 – Multiplier and IRR 
Variable Obs Means Median Std.dev Min Max 
Multiplier 458 10.582 0.9687 83.44 0 1332.798 
IRR 458 0.2681 -0.01439 2.3168 -1 34 
 
IRR has a large variability from losing all of the money to making 34 times the 
invested funds as a result of extreme values in the data (the mean is 0.27 and the standard 
deviation is 2.32). In fact, startup companies have large variance in their results. In a 
regression, IRR has such large variance that it is difficult to find any explanatory variables 
that can predict the values. By coding success (return of the investment), the extreme 
variability of IRR is eliminated allowing the important factors to be estimated.  
I will use a regression model and probit model to test whether angel investor 
characteristics are associated with their success, using the same variables. A probit model is 
useful to estimate the probability that an observation with particular characteristics will fall 
into one of two categories.  
 
  
                                          
3 I assume the yearsheld of investment within one year as 0.5 to avoid very high irr and one 
observation which has the irr over 50,000 is eliminated.  
13 
 
a. Dependent Variable 
 
There are three measures of success based on increasing levels of IRR. The first 
definition is IRR greater than the median of all of the projects (-0.01439)4. The second 
definition is based on the mean of the projects (0.268) after eliminating one with a calculated 
value over 50,000, which evidently has problems with the data on years held. Only one 
observation is eliminated. The third definition requires IRR > = 1.0 (100%), which is a high 
standard of success.  
Figure 2 shows that 50%, 34% and 14% of the angels are respectively observed as 
successful investors in their investment performance according to the measures of success. 
Figure 2 – Success or Failure 
 
 
The scale of success according to measurement standard is shown in Table 5.  
  
                                          
4 In this case, due to the negative value of the mean, losing money is ironically defined as 
successful of investment. Negative value of mean comes from many of -1 of IRR which is caused 
by the observation that invest output value is zero in the data set. 
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Table 5 – Success Scale 
Scale Freq. Percent Cum. 
None Successful 227   50.00 50.00 
Median Standard 74 16.16 66.16 
Mean Standard 91 19.87 86.13 
High standard 64 13.97 100.00 
Total 548 100.00  
 
b. Explanatory Variable 
 Many factors can have an effect on the performance of the angels. Wiltbank and 
Boeker (2007) point out three main factors: due diligence (diligence), experience in the 
industry of their portfolio companies (industryexp), and interacted time with their portfolio 
companies (interaction). Chua and Wu (2009) include the following factors as their 
independent variables: the total amount of time spent interacting with the venture post-
investment (interaction), time spent on due diligence (diligence), source of investment 
opportunity (sourcegroupscreen, sourcegrouppresent, sourcepersonal, sourcepersonal1, 
sourcerefer, and sourcerefer2), angel entrepreneurial experience (yearsentre), and angel 
investment experience (yearsinv).  
For the research question about post-investment involvement, I add three factors to 
the independent variables: interacted time with their portfolio companies (interaction), due 
diligence (diligence), and duration of investment (yearsheld). On the other hand, for the 
additional research question about basic characteristics of angels, I include the factors of their 
education level (edlevel) and experience in the industry of their investment company 
(industryexp) as independent variables. 
However, in order to increase the power to predict dependent variable, I created 
another set of variables instead of interaction, diligence, and edlevel variables. Whereas the 
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interaction variable is reported in ordinal terms (1=rarely; 2=annually; 3=quarterly; 
4=monthly; 5=weekly; 6=daily), the interaction times variable is assigned to each ordinal 
ranking the number of times per year indicated (1=0; 2=1 time/year; 3=4 times/year; 4=12 
times/year; 5=52 times/year; 6=365 times/year) as shown in Chua and Wu (2009). The 
diligence is highly variable, so it is coded to the dilig20ormore variable as at least 20 hours. 
Also, the edlevel variable is coded to the edlevel_high as at least J.D. or not. Education level 
is at least college graduate for almost all angel investors. Table 6 presents the summarized 
results of independent variables. 
Table 6 – Independent Variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Interaction times     88.67    144.23      0.00    365.00 
Dilig 20 or more      0.62      0.49      0.00      1.00 
Years held      3.99      3.27      0.00     23.00 
edlevel_high      0.76      0.43      0.00      1.00 
Industry experience      6.69     10.36      0.00     47.00 
 
c. Control variables 
 The other variables that seem to affect on the dependent variable are control variables. 
Control variables include angel investment experience (yearsinv), stage of the venture at the 
time of their investment (stage), and the number of co-investors (coinvestors). The summary 
statistics for control variables is as follows. 
Table 7 – Control Variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Years inv     12.96      9.23      1.00     49.00 
stage      2.14      1.09      1.00      5.00 
coinvestors      3.53      4.54      0.00     12.00 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
Estimation results 
The regression results of the ordinary least squared regression (OLS) model for 
testing the research questions are as seen in Table 8. There are 92 observations with the 
necessary data on the explanatory variables and on the IRR. 
Table 8 – OLS Regression Estimation Results 
 median_standard mean_standard higher_standard 
VARIABLES success1 success2 success3 
Interaction times 0.000314 0.000532 0.000306 
 (0.426) (0.191) (0.224) 
dilig20ormore 0.138 0.201 0.183** 
 (0.295) (0.141) (0.0314) 
yearsheld 0.0512 0.00163 -0.122*** 
 (0.223) (0.970) (1.43e-05) 
yearsheldsq -0.00151 -0.00111 0.00450*** 
 (0.475) (0.607) (0.00113) 
edlevel_high -0.0566 0.0472 0.0913 
 (0.649) (0.712) (0.249) 
Industry exp 0.00514 0.00371 -0.000609 
 (0.335) (0.497) (0.857) 
Years inv -0.00686 -0.00445 -0.000196 
 (0.264) (0.480) (0.960) 
stage 0.122** 0.0797 0.0444 
 (0.0170) (0.124) (0.165) 
coinvestors 0.00202 -0.00504 -0.00669 
 (0.869) (0.689) (0.392) 
Constant 0.113 0.108 0.270* 
 (0.619) (0.644) (0.0636) 
Observations 92 92 92 
R-squared 0.212 0.156 0.316 
p-value in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
17 
 
 Looking at the results of the OLS regression, the lack of statistically significant 
predictors is clear. It is difficult to predict success of these investments. This result are very 
similar the results of the probit regression as shown in Appendix Table 2. However, there are 
several things to notice.  
First, in the model of the median definition, stage is the only variable that predicts 
angel’s success at the 95% confidence level. The median definition results in more likely 
success based on the stage of the project with greater success at more advanced stages, but 
nothing else. Given that stage is 1-5, the effect is up to about 30%. However, even though 
most are stages 1-3 and stages 4-5 are rare, stage 4 and 5 likely signify a high probability of 
success. Thus, in order to increase capital supply to early stage firms, policy-makers should 
encourage angel investors to concentrate on early stages. Distribution of stage level is shown 
in Appendix Table 3. 
 Second, the mean definition results in no statistically significant factors at all at the 
95% confidence level as seen in Table 8. So far the results indicate that success of angel 
investors is very difficult to predict, which might be very well true.          
 However, the higher standard of a large IRR does show that the passage of more time 
is a strong positive factor (“years held”) after a point. The model is quadratic and shows that 
success is declining at first (the linear term) but then increasing (the quadratic term). If only 
the linear term is included, the results imply negative effects of time, which is against 
expectations. Longer term should be a good thing. In fact it is, but only after the passage of 
some time. The quadratic term is important to analyze the effect of duration of investment. 
The second factor that matters is diligence (hours worked on due diligence), which 
predicts the higher level of success, if diligence exceeds 20 hours. The amount of time varies 
a lot, and there is no indication that many hours make the result better, but rather that there is 
a minimum effort needed, which appears to be about 20 hours. 
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On the contrary, education level does not matter in any model, which is surprising, 
but note that virtually all investors here are college graduates, who could certainly acquire the 
necessary skills on the job, so the range of education is not relevant. 
Additionally, an analysis of the amount invested shows that it is difficult to predict 
how much is invested – an amount that varies a great deal – but that if the investor interacts 
more, the investor invests more. That is logical, as frequent interaction should be associated 
with more money. Nothing else predicts the amount. See Appendix Table 4.  
 
Robustness Tests 
 I perform robustness checks using the probit model. In the probit model, the 
predicted probability indicate the likelihood of y=1. If the predicted probability is greater than 
0.5, I can predict that y=1, otherwise y=0. The percent corrected predicted values are the 
proportion of true predictions to total predictions. So, I can say the higher the predicted 
probabilities, the more goodness of model.  
 The average of predicted probabilities for successful investors is respectively about 
56.5%, 32.6%, and 10.9% in three models which is similar to the actual frequency (50%, 
34%, and 14%) for success. For such risky investments, these success rates are useful. 
Figure 3 – Predicted Probabilities 
   
Success1 
(Median Standard) 
Success2 
(Mean Standard) 
Success3 
(Higher Standard) 
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 However, the percentages of correctly classified of the values in three probit models 
are a very different, which are 66.3%, 68.4%, and 91.3% respectively and the rest are 
misclassified as shown in Figure 4. Thus, I can say that the higher standard model has a 
robust power to correctly predict the values, most being failure of the investment.    
 Figure 4 – Percentages of Correctly Classified 
   
Success1 
(Median Standard) 
Success2 
(Mean Standard) 
Success3 
(Higher Standard) 
 
Limitations 
 
The data set used for this study came from a survey which was conducted to angel 
investors who are members of angel investor groups with low response rate, which makes it 
have several inherent biases as mentioned in the two previous papers that used this data set. 
The data may not be representative of angels in general since angels who do not belong to 
groups may be different from those who were surveyed in their investment behavior. Also the 
data only came from angels who were still financial survivors, which may induce survivor 
bias, missing data from angels who failed and left the groups.  
Also, this data set has difficulties with missing information within the angels who 
were already surveyed. Several essential variables are missing in different patterns, for 
different observations. As a result, the sample size for regressions is limited. This problem 
cannot be avoided. 
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However, when I consider the paucity of data on angels and rare empirical studies of 
angel investors, the results of this research show that diligence matters at a minimal value of 
20 hours, while other factors do not predict success well.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 Angel investors are vitally important for supplying capital to help start-up firms to 
grow, with allowing a company to overcome the capital gap in their early-stage. They also 
provide non-financial assistance, involving as post-investments to increase their investment 
performance. With the important role of angels, a number of countries have chosen policies 
or government support ranging from tax incentives to co-investment as a catalyst for 
developing angel market.  
I examined what factors of angel investors affect the outcome of angel investment. 
Due to the large variation of IRR, I coded it as success or fail. Then, I use OLS and a probit 
model to estimate regressions with five explanatory variables that represent the post-
investment involvement of angel investors (interacted time, due diligence, and duration of 
investment) and the basic characteristics of angel investors (their education level and their 
experience period in the industry of venture).  
According to my study, the success of angel investors is very difficult to predict as 
most think, especially in low level of success. The only thing I can predict in low level of 
success is that the later the stage, the more likely it is to be successful. However, the other 
factors have no predictive power. Even though the stage variable is controlled in this research, 
in the point of public policy, policy makers can have implication to increase the capital to 
early-stage start-ups, with decreasing angels’ investment motivation in later-stage firms.   
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 However, this research indicates that in the high level of success, angel investors may 
positively influence their investment performance with sufficient due diligence and 
maintaining long-term investment as post-investment involvement of angel investors. There 
is no indication that many hours makes the outcome better, but rather that there is a minimum 
effort needed, which appears to be about 20 hours.  
In addition, the other factors related with the basic characteristics, such as education 
level and experience the angel investors had in an industry related to this venture, are not 
statistically significant factors according to this research.     
 Therefore, I conclude that the stage of the venture at the time of their investment, due 
diligence and duration of investment are the primary determinants of the successful angel 
investors. Also, this research indicates that the post-investment involvement of angel 
investors rather than the basic characteristics are more likely to be related with the improved 
performance of the angel investors. 
 Additional research using other data sets will continue to increase understanding of 
angel investors and their performance, and will help policy makers set criteria to select angel 
investors for targeted government support. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
totalcashout 814878.13 2.72e+06 0.00 2.10e+07 
totalinvested 128560.99 350283.61 5000.00 3.00e+06 
yearsheld 4.31 3.48 0.00 23.00 
yearsinv 13.20 9.11 1.00 49.00 
yearsentre 19.10 9.74 5.00 49.00 
edlevel 2.47 1.10 0.00 5.00 
stage 2.13 1.08 1.00 5.00 
initialinvest 76505.49 137323.19 5000.00 1.00e+06 
initrevs 2.21e+06 9.05e+06 0.00 6.00e+07 
coinvestors 3.66 4.61 0.00 12.00 
diligence 114.35 539.45 0.00 5000.00 
industryexp 7.10 10.88 0.00 47.00 
Interaction 3.84 1.71 1.00 6.00 
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Table 2 – Probit Estimation Results 
 
 median_standard mean_standard higher_standard 
VARIABLES success1 success2 success3 
Interaction times 0.000969 0.00145 0.00224 
 (0.463) (0.191) (0.285) 
dilig20ormore 0.361 0.580 1.119* 
 (0.326) (0.119) (0.0780) 
yearsheld 0.0505 0.0291 -0.768 
 (0.833) (0.839) (0.536) 
yearsheldsq 0.00594 -0.00570 -0.0488 
 (0.789) (0.545) (0.835) 
edlevel_high -0.172 0.127 0.967 
 (0.642) (0.709) (0.192) 
industryexp 0.0171 0.0117 0.00795 
 (0.302) (0.442) (0.815) 
yearsinv -0.0189 -0.0128 -0.00979 
 (0.334) (0.506) (0.878) 
stage 0.367** 0.235 0.278 
 (0.0185) (0.103) (0.219) 
coinvestors 0.00182 -0.0148 -0.120 
 (0.960) (0.686) (0.110) 
Constant -0.946 -1.175 -0.349 
 (0.262) (0.103) (0.851) 
    
Observations 92 92 92 
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 – Distribution of Stage Level 
 
stage Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 59 30.57 30.57 
2 83 43.01 73.58 
3 33 17.10 90.67 
4 10 5.18 95.85 
5 8 4.15 100 
Total 193 100.00  
 
 
 
Table 4 – Estimation of Amount of Initial Investment 
 
VARIABLES initialinvest VARIABLES initialinvest 
Interaction times 396.9*** industryexp -1,307 
 (0.000407)  (0.371) 
dilig20ormore -2,763 yearsinv -1,931 
 (0.939)  (0.252) 
yearsheld 4,564 stage 4,288 
 (0.691)  (0.755) 
yearsheldsq -51.31 coinvestors 492.6 
 (0.929)  (0.884) 
edlevel_high -26,222 Constant 67,570 
 (0.443)  (0.279) 
Observations 92   
R-squared 0.216   
p-value in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
